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——— 
BY STEVEN FETTER AND THOMAS GARWIN 
he treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has sanctified the 
“zero option.” It has long been understood that it is easier to verify a 
complete ban on a weapon system than it is to verify a numerical limit. A 
complete prohibition is easier to verify because a single sighting of a banned 
weapon would constitute clear evidence of a violation. Moreover, a complete 
ban would eliminate training, testing, and repair activities that could serve as a 
cover for clandestine weapon deployments or could support a sudden break-
out from a treaty. Although a total ban may be the best option from the 
standpoint of verification, this is not realistic for many weapon system.  
 In the past, numerical limits could be verified adequately because the 
weapon systems in question—missile silos, bombers, and ballistic-missile sub-
marines—were hard to conceal from national technical means (NTM) of veri-
fication (primarily reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites). Un-
fortunately, changes in technology and in the strategic environment are giving 
rise to new weapons whose deployment will be difficult to verify using cur-
rent techniques. Mobile land-based ballistic missiles, for example, are gaining 
increased prominence in the strategic forces of both sides, primarily because 
they are less vulnerable to preemptive destruction than immobile silo-based 
missiles. But mobile missiles are much more difficult to count since they are 
designed to move around the countryside and are often hidden from view. 
Limits on nuclear cruise missiles would also be difficult to verify using NTM 
because they are small and because the conventional- and nuclear-armed ver-
sions are nearly indistinguishable. In addition, the INF Treaty is giving new 
impetus to the search for cooperative restrictions on the military confronta-
tion in Central Europe, where numerical limits have been hard to agree on in 
part because of verification difficulties.  
 The United States does not have to limit itself to NTM, however. The 
INF treaty, as well as recent Soviet acceptance of the use of on-site inspec-
tion in a variety of arms control settings, indicates a new willingness to accept 
at least some cooperative and intrusive inspection measures to verify compli-
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ance with arms limitations. This chapter examines a promising cooperative 
way of facilitating the verification of numerical limits on weapons that has 
received relatively little attention: the tagging of treaty-limited items.1 Essen-
tially, the use of tags transforms a numerical limit into a ban on untagged 
items. The result is that many of the verification advantages of the "zero-
option" can be retained for a numerical limit. Moreover, tagging systems can 
verify a numerical limit without yielding simultaneous information on the 
location of all limited items, thereby reducing the intrusiveness of the moni-
toring required to achieve a given level of confidence that a limit is being 
obeyed. 
 Tagging works by certifying that every weapon observed is one of those 
permitted under a numerical limit. A tagging system would involve the 
manufacture of a number of tags equal to the number of weapons limited by 
treaty. One tag could be affixed to a crucial part of each allowed weapon. If 
even one untagged weapon were ever seen (by NTM, through on-site inspec-
tions, or even by nationals of the inspected party loyal to the treaty regime), 
then there would be prima facie evidence of a treaty violation. Other methods 
of counting a deployed force can only suggest that the allowed total is being 
exceeded, an indication that is unlikely to be conclusive and which might tend 
instead to cast doubt on all the information going into the count. Tagging 
produces a much stronger impetus for political action in the event of a viola-
tion, because observation of an untagged system would provide unambiguous 
evidence of an overall violation.  
 Tagging does not function as an independent verification system. Tagging 
would only be useful as an adjunct to NTM or as part of a fabric of coopera-
tive verification procedures carefully tailored to a specific treaty proposal. 
Tagging systems have three crucial ingredients: a number of tags equal to the 
number of allowed weapons, a mechanism for associating a tag with a unique 
weapon, and a protocol for verifying the authenticity of the tags. In most 
applications, checking tags would be an aspect of on-site or challenge inspec-
tions, but systems are conceivable in which the authenticity of tags would be 
checked remotely. In some contexts, tagging systems that do not require the 
affixing of any physical tags may be feasible. 
 The chapter goes on to explore the potential value of tagging by describ-
ing the possible application of tags to five types of deployment limits. It then 
presents a discussion of various general problems that arise in tagging, 
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together with possible solutions, followed by a discussion of how the complex 
additional burden of designing and negotiating a useful tagging regime might 
be borne in arms control negotiations. Finally, the question of when the bene-
fits of verification by tags may be likely to outweigh the disadvantages is 
addressed. 
 
Examples of Tagging Systems 
 The following examples are intended to show the weaknesses as well as 
the strengths of the tagging concept. 
 
 Soldiers. One possible arms control limitation is on the number of soldiers 
allowed in certain areas. Limits on the number of troops in Central Europe 
have been under discussion since the mid-1950s, as have schemes for moni-
toring such an agreement. Usually a continual presence of inspectors or 
remote monitoring equipment at checkpoints supplemented by occasional for-
ays by human inspectors has been thought to be required. It is unclear, 
though, how the observation of an unusually large number of troops in a par-
ticular region would be anything more than an occasion for suspicions that 
could not be easily resolved. Conversely, the intrusiveness required to moni-
tor agreed force dispositions in this manner might yield evidence of local or 
overall force weaknesses that in a crisis could make the military balance less, 
rather than more, stable. With a tagging system, however, the discovery of a 
single soldier without proper identification (i.e., without a tag) would be con-
clusive evidence of a violation, yet no information need be collected about 
either the overall number of troops in the region or their disposition.  
 A tagging system for troops might work in the following manner. Sup-
pose that limitations were imposed on the total number of active military per-
sonnel in each of several zones. At random or fixed intervals (say, every six 
months) the monitoring party would supply enough ID cards (tags) so that 
the monitored party could issue one to each soldier in the zone. The ID cards 
would have a section where a thumb print could be registered within two or 
three days of the issuance of the card. (Chemicals in the card could ensure 
that after this active period the thumb print would either no longer register or 
that the card itself would indicate that a longer delay had occurred.)  Every 
soldier in a controlled zone would be required to carry the appropriate ID 
card with his or her own thumb print. Transfers of soldiers could be accom-
modated by the exchange of used ID cards for new ones. 
 With such a system in place, if an inspector ever found a soldier without a 
valid ID card, there would be a clear violation that could be investigated 
directly. In most other verification schemes, the total number of soldiers in the 
zone would be inferred from the number and types of units observed to be 
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deployed there, or from some other set of imprecise measures that would not 
identify any specific individual as constituting a breach of the limit, even if 
they gave some general indication of a violation. 
 In practice, this tagging scheme would have to be elaborated in great 
detail. Most obviously, there is the technical design of an ID card that could 
be personalized by thumb print within the required time period and not pro-
vided only to those troops likely to come into contact with inspectors. 
Because the cards would be provided by the tagging party, and because 
inspectors could randomly recover a small fraction of the ID cards and return 
them to the laboratory for detailed analysis, occasional changes in the details 
of card technology could be used to ensure over time that there were no con-
tinuing copying or misuse of the tags. 
 The example suggests several other aspects of any tagging system. As 
implied by the mention of inspectors, tagging only works if there is some 
chance of "observing" the controlled items and the presence or absence of 
associated tags. In the case of ground troops, we have assumed that inspec-
tors would be given fairly free access to transit routes, if not to all military 
bases. The personalized quality of the ID card would ensure that no single tag 
could be used to provide safe transit for a succession of soldiers, who would 
then disappear into uninspectable bases or other safe havens. 
 Finally, the example suggests that while tags can help ensure that a pre-
cisely defined limit was not exceeded, there are many potential problems of 
verification and arms control more general for which tags would provide no 
help at all. If an inspector, for example, came upon an individual in uniform 
with an automatic weapon but no tag, it might be explained that the person 
was a police officer or some other quasi-military officer (e.g., a customs 
agent) and not a soldier at all. In general, soldiers traveling out of uniform and 
separately from their weapons on civilian transport may not be identifiable as 
soldiers. Tagging cannot remedy imprecise definitions of what is controlled by 
an agreement. Only if the parties can agree on a clear definition of who is a 
"soldier" can numbers of soldiers be controlled. 
 If a precise definition could be agreed upon, however, in periods of 
international tension (or up to twice a year at the option of either side), sol-
diers as defined by the treaty might be required not only to carry tags but also 
to have their foreheads marked with temporarily indelible ink. This procedure 
would help ensure that inspectors could identify soldiers and that others not 
so identified could not contribute substantially to the prosecution of an attack. 
Over any substantial time period, soldiers could not operate effectively if they 
could not train, were not formed into units, and if they lacked weapons and 
communication. Limits on manpower, verified by tagging, accompanied by 
other sorts of constraints to prevent circumvention of the numerical limitation 
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could effectively constrain military potential. If these limits were applied in 
many local sectors, one could build confidence that concentration for a local 
attack was not under way.  
 
Tanks and Other Conventional Weapons. Since they are an essential element 
in offensive military potential, tanks are an obvious target for negotiated arms 
limitation. Compared to limits on people, limits on hardware are in some ways 
easier and in some ways harder to verify by tagging. Unlike people, certain 
major classes of military hardware have no civilian use and so cannot merely 
blend into the civilian landscape. Such specialized hardware includes tanks, 
artillery, fighter-bombers, most bridging equipment, and most munitions, but 
not jeeps, trucks, buses, and transport aircraft. Observation of a tank leaves 
little  question that it is a controlled item. For the same reason of singularity, 
though, close-up scrutiny of a soldier would reveal fewer military secrets than 
close-up scrutiny of an advanced weapon. 
 Several other differences make hardware harder to control through tags. 
First, there is less reason for any particular piece of hardware to emerge from 
hiding or to be involved in exercises and training. An opponent determined to 
violate an agreement could maintain a stock of tagged equipment to be used 
in peacetime operations and an untagged stockpile that would be kept out of 
view until shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. This problem is conceptu-
ally similar to the possibility of unknown stockpiles in an absolute ban on a 
class of weapons. A possibly decisive difference, though, is that, in the case of 
a numerical limitation, troops would have the opportunity to train with the 
legal weapons of the same type. 
 Second, each hardware item has less of an essential identity than a person. 
With a thumbprint tag, one can be sure that the monitored party is not using a 
single tag and "transplantable thumbs" to cover the transit of multiple people 
across inspected areas. With hardware, some care would have to be taken to 
design ways to take the equivalent of a fingerprint for each controlled 
weapon, or to attach absolutely nonremovable tags to crucial pieces of the 
item. The complexity of the problem is indicated by the fact that a nonremov-
able tag on the fender of a tank would be of little help because the same 
fender could be unbolted and used seriatim to transfer large numbers of tanks 
to unknown storage warehouses. If the turret of a tank represented a large 
part of the value of the tank and the turret could not be easily removed or 
concealed, however, then a nontransferable tag on the turret would suffice, 
because a limit on tank turrets would be equivalent to a limit on tanks. 
 As a technical matter, a nontransferable, noncopyable tag for a tank turret 
is not hard to devise. One would not require absolute confidence that each tag 
had not been tampered with, and so one could accept the occasional reliability 
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problems that attend any electronic components and batteries. The tagging 
system could use a capacitance, contact, or ultrasound sensor, or two electri-
cally communicating devices on opposite sides of the turret, to ensure that 
once emplaced it could not removed without providing a tell-tale record. 
More simply, a limited amount of special epoxy glue made with unstable com-
ponents and identifying trace elements or isotopes might be provided. Or tags 
might be emplaced with ordinary glue and an ultrasound fingerprint of the 
resulting assembly recorded. In the case of an electronic tag, copying could be 
prevented by cryptographic keys stored in a shielded microchip. Tags that 
would be recovered occasionally could be made further secure against copy-
ing through serial numbers and the recording of random aspects of their phys-
ical microstructure, through the use of minute amounts of complex artificial 
chemicals, or through the use of altered isotopic composition in particular 
small parts of the tag. A nation attempting to counterfeit such tags could nev-
er be sure that the copy duplicated all the identifying characteristics of the tag.  
 If several classes of tags were provided, or if the tags had serial numbers, 
then tagging could be used to control the number of tanks in each of several 
zones of interest, as well as the total in the overall region. The tags for each 
zone might be different colors and shapes, so that close inspection would not 
be required to ascertain that a tank was in an allowed area; only a small num-
ber of random close-in inspections would be required to verify that the tags 
were authentic. Such a scheme would be complicated, though, if tanks were 
rotated among zones and new tags were thus required to be installed. 
 If details about tank dispositions were not considered sensitive, the moni-
tored party might simply be responsible for turning over to the monitoring 
party a roster of which tag serial numbers were in each zone prior to the 
beginning of each inspection period. Even if the dispositions were sensitive, 
the roster idea could be adapted using cryptographic techniques so that the 
monitored party could keep the overall roster secret while still providing 
assurance that any particular observed system was within a sublimit for a par-
ticular zone. Cryptographic or electronic means could be used to produce the 
equivalent of a system where the roster is deposited with a neutral and confi-
dential judge who responds "yes" or "no" to queries of the form, "Is tank 
number 1197 allowed in zone 11?" 
 
Rail- or Land-Mobile ICBMs. ICBMs are larger and more valuable than 
tanks, and they probably require more frequent servicing. These may not be 
the decisive differences where verification is concerned. Nations may be more 
anxious to keep secret the technical details of their construction, and aerody-
namic requirements are such that tags probably could not be permanently 
attached to missiles. Tagging the canisters in which the missiles are trans-
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ported and stored is an obvious alternative, but this would require that the tag 
provide information sufficient to ensure that a tagged canister could not be 
used to transfer illegal missiles to covert deployment area. The tagging 
scheme would have to ensure that canisters were not returned to the factory 
or repair depots empty or containing a decoy. This could be accomplished by 
an agreement that missiles would not be removed from canisters except at 
designated repair depots equipped with appropriate portal monitoring and 
inspection systems. A seal or an acoustic sensor that monitored standing 
waves inside the canisters could be used to ensure that the canisters were not 
opened except at the designated facilities. 
 Tags on missiles (or missile canisters) could be checked in a variety of 
ways. In the case of a rail-mobile missile system, it may be the case that such 
trains would have a distinctive and undisguiseable signature; the length or 
weight distribution of the trains, for example, could be measured using an 
unmanned sensor. After identifying such a signature, a tag reader, using a 
short-range radio or infrared beam, could try to interrogate a tag. Such auto-
matic systems might be installed at choke points in the rail network. 
 For land-mobile missile systems, the verification protocol might allow 
occasional free access by inspectors within a random fraction of the specified 
deployment area. Tags would be checked on any missiles that were found in 
the area. Such inspections would be relatively effective. Consider, for exam-
ple, a case in which 100 untagged missiles were illegally placed in a deploy-
ment area. If each inspection examined only one percent of the deployment 
area, and if there were only a 20 percent chance of locating each missile pre-
sent in the inspection zone, then only four inspections per year would assure 
an eighty percent chance of discovering the violation within two years, no 
matter how many missiles were allowed under the agreement. 
 Alternatively (and perhaps especially outside of agreed deployment zones) 
the parties could rely on NTM to keep track of controlled systems and their 
tags. A tag incorporating a navigation system (either radio or inertial) might 
record its own movements, eliminating the need for real-time access for direct 
inspection. If the movements of the mobile system were randomized, then 
knowing some of the past movements of a weapon would not compromise its 
future survivability. If there were questions about a controlled item observed 
by NTM on a highway at a certain time, it would be possible, by examining 
the stored movement record, to prove whether or not a tagged system had 
been at that location at the time in question. The parties might even be willing 
to give each other constant information on the location of tagged missiles 
outside of deployment areas, reducing the risk that the monitoring party 
would reveal information about its intelligence capabilities in the process of 
requesting challenge inspections. The characteristics of the controlled weapon 
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and the detection system would have to be such that a tagged weapon could 
not serve as a decoy to provide safe passage to one or more untagged  weap-
ons kept in close proximity to a tagged systems. Tagging cannot eliminate the 
possibility of unknown deployments of limited weapons. If inspectors and tag 
readers were placed at the portals of all known production, test, and repair 
facilities, however, one could at least guarantee that no untagged weapons 
would be serviced there, thus forcing a cheater to establish a completely par-
allel covert maintenance and testing system. The risk of clandestine deploy-
ments could be further minimized by limiting the number of people trained to 
operate the controlled system. 
Cruise Missiles. Weapons that are relatively small and easily moved are of 
course less likely to be observed by national technical means, either in normal 
operation or when deliberately concealed. Limitations on cruise missiles could 
be verified with tagging schemes similar to those used for mobile ICBMs, but 
cooperative measures and more stringent inspections would be essential to in-
crease the likelihood of detecting untagged systems. The key locations to 
monitor a limit on cruise missiles would probably be repair and maintenance 
facilities. 
 The dual nuclear and conventional capability of cruise missiles also poses 
problems. If there is concern about ostensibly conventionally-armed cruise 
missiles actually being deployed with nuclear warheads, tags might be modi-
fied to include plastic scintillation material and appropriate instrumentation, 
which would provide evidence of any close-by nuclear material. Of course, 
even if a tagging scheme were capable of detecting the peacetime deployment 
of nuclear warheads on missiles declared to be conventionally-armed, it could 
not prevent replacing conventional warheads with nuclear warheads in a crisis 
or at the outset of war. One might solve the quick-conversion problem by 
agreeing to specific technical restrictions on cruise missile design. 
Submarine Deployments. Coastal keep-out zones in which missile-launching 
submarines would not be allowed have been suggested as a way to guarantee 
increased warning time for command authorities and for alert strategic forces, 
thereby reducing a possible incentive to strike first during a crisis. Alterna-
tively, safe zones from which attack submarines and other anti-submarine 
warfare forces would be barred have been suggested to improve the surviv-
ability of the missile-launching submarine forces. Although compliance with 
such agreements in peacetime obviously could not guarantee their continued 
observance in wartime, it is worth noting that a tagging scheme could allow 
nations to verify compliance with such agreements even during crises.  
 Each side would be given a limited number of challenge opportunities 
each year during which it could ask a specific submarine to demonstrate that 
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it was outside the prohibited areas. Since submarines cannot travel fast and 
remain undetected, it would be sufficient for the submarine to surface and 
make its location known within two days, so long as it surfaced more than 
perhaps a thousand miles from the keep-out zone. A transmitting tag, which 
would be carried permanently on-board each submarine but which would be 
turned on only during such challenges and only after the submarine surfaced, 
would serve to identify the submarine as the one whose position had been 
requested. The time delay would reduce the information about patrol patterns 
that might otherwise be gleaned from these inspections. 
General Characteristics of Tags 
 The idea underlying any tagging scheme is that if all allowed items are 
tagged, then the detection of a single untagged item would constitute direct 
evidence of a treaty violation. In principle, tagging makes monitoring numeri-
cal limitations as easy as monitoring total prohibitions, because the monitor-
ing party need only verify the ban on untagged items. On the negative side, 
however, any tagging system itself would introduce a degree of complexity to 
arms control verification, and the continued existence of allowed production, 
testing, and operational capabilities may prompt worries about potential eva-
sion of the monitoring system or a sudden break-out from limitations. Still, 
tags offer considerable potential for improved verification regimes. 
  Any tagging system should have the following general characteristics: 
  1. It must be impossible to copy the tag without detection, for otherwise 
the monitored party could simply produce counterfeit tags to cover weapons 
deployed in excess of the limit. To make it more difficult for the monitored 
party to learn how to copy tags, the tags could be replaced at intervals with 
ones using different anticounterfeiting techniques. As a test before a tagging 
system was agreed upon, the monitoring party could offer a prize to any citi-
zen who succeeded in defeating the anticounterfeiting scheme. 
 Tags might be made non-copyable in three generic ways: use of coded 
electronic signals, use of some natural property of a material for identifica-
tion, and use of artificial properties that need not be fully disclosed to the 
tagged party. 
 Electronic tags have many advantages: the technology is well understood, 
the cost is likely to be low, the identity of a particular item need not be 
divulged, and the authenticity of a tag could be determined without direct 
access to the weapon on which it is emplaced.  
 If parties to an agreement do not object to tags that would identify 
individual weapons, then the simplest electronic tag would work as the 
equivalent of a "one-time pad." Electronic access to the tag's memory would 
only be allowed following the input of special code unique to the particular 
tag and to the number of times it had been read previously. Each tag would 
report its serial number, the number of times it had been inspected, and a 
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unique secret number for that serial number and index. The secret numbers 
would be compared with a master list to authenticate the reading. Each secret 
number would be erased after it was read, and the series of secret numbers 
would be different for each tag. The monitored party could be informed of, or 
learn by its own devices, all the information that was transmitted to and from 
the tag during this process and yet could not use this information to counter-
feit tags. 
 If parties were unwilling to allow the identification of individual tags, then 
more complicated cryptographic schemes would be required. If the tags can-
not indicate their identity, then their input and output must be identical. If tags 
themselves are identical, then the problem of preventing illegal duplication 
would be a very difficult one. In either case the tag would have to be pro-
tected by various physical means against nonelectronic means of discovering 
the series of secret numbers; for example, the chip could be shielded and pro-
vided with a membrane that would trigger a self-destruct mechanism if vio-
lated. In the case of unique tags, each tag need only protect its codes against 
tampering that does leave any indication of misuse. But in the case of identical 
tags, one must prevent even destructive means of discovering the secret 
codes, since a few tags could be sacrificed in a counterfeiting effort. This may 
be possible; the tag need only destroy its information in response to intrusive 
examination. Another possible method of allowing the parties to retain the 
anonymity of particular weapons would be to allow the use of unique tags but 
to interpose a piece of sealed equipment or a neutral party between the signal 
from the unique tag and the tagging party. This intermediary would certify 
that the tag reading was valid but not reveal the detailed basis of this certifi-
cation. 
 Tag reading could be done by a direct connection to a local or remote 
console, or the tag could be queried by a transmitter. In the case of unique 
tags, especially those in which the tag or tag reader records the geographic 
position of the tag, the most sensible approach is to allow the monitored party 
to provide the communications circuit from the monitoring party to the tag. 
 Tags could also be based on patterns in a certain material or substance;  
for example, one could take a three-dimensional image of a certain portion of 
a Fiberglas missile canister using a stereoscopic camera, an acoustic or elec-
tron microscope, or acoustic holography. Alternatively, identifying material 
could be affixed to the weapon being controlled, as with glitter blown into a 
layer of epoxy on the weapon, or the use of a fiber-optic seal. If the tag were 
an intrinsic characteristic of the weapon, which would make duplication, 
spoofing, or swapping very difficult, the tagging would have to be done on-
site by the monitoring party. The tag reading would be done with the same 
type of instrument used for the initial imaging, which would almost certainly 
require an on-site inspection. The pattern itself could be public knowledge, 
because  the principle of the tag in this case is the nonreproducibility of com-
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plex three-dimensional patterns. One would only need to be sure that the 
pattern came from a particular tag. Although all tags based on patterns would 
be inherently distinguishable, a tag reader could be devised to convert the 
identification information into a "yes" or "no" answer. 
   As noted already, there is great scope for using very subtle features of 
tags to prevent their duplication if some fraction of the provided tags could be 
recovered and tested in a laboratory. Such subtle features could include 
altered isotopic composition of particular parts, the deposit of a monoclonal 
antigen within a fiber, or seemingly random imperfections in a printing or 
manufacturing process.  
 2. It must be impossible to spoof the tagging system, or to fool it into 
thinking that a valid tag exists where there actually is none. For example, it 
must be impossible to re-route signals between the tag reader and a counter-
feit tag so that the tag reader would actually receive a return signal from a 
valid tag at another location. Although preventing or detecting such signal 
displacements would be straightforward if an inspector had direct access to 
the tag, special precautions would have to be taken if tag reading was accom-
plished remotely. The general solution is to include coded location and time 
information in the response elicited from the tag. 
 3. It must not be possible to move the tag from one weapon to another 
without the knowledge of the monitoring party. If tag swapping were possi-
ble, then valid tags could simply be moved to the weapons being inspected at 
a particular time and place, or at least to those systems more susceptible to 
inspection by the other side. If tags were glued onto the tagged weapons, it 
could be arranged for part of the tag to change color or melt if exposed to the 
solvent required for the glue employed. An analog is in use in the U.S. 
domestic economy: to discourage the illegal parts business, automobiles now 
are made with serial number tags glued to their major sheet metal parts, and 
owners are warned not to attempt to remove these labels. 
  4. The tagging system must not aid the monitoring party in locating 
weapons in real-time, since this could render tagged weapons more vulnerable 
to preemptive attack. Such position information might even allow terminally-
guided munitions to home on the tags during an attack. For example, a radio 
beacon attached to tanks or mobile missiles would certainly allow them to be 
counted by satellite receivers, but it could also allow attacking warheads to 
home on those targets. 
 5. More generally, the tag should reveal only information that is required 
for the purposes of verification.   In other words, tags should not be agents of 
espionage that collect sensitive data about the limited weapon or its deploy-
ment patterns. Parties might be unwilling, for example, to emplace tags that 
could reveal low rates of readiness previously unknown to the other side. 
Concerns about espionage could be alleviated if the physical details of the 
tags and the tagging system's operation were exhaustively disclosed to the 
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monitored party, but this would restrict the use of sensitive technologies and 
may make the tags easier to copy or spoof. On the other hand, the use of 
open tag technology would make it easier to publicize evidence of treaty vio-
lations, since no sensitive sources or methods could be compromised. The 
monitored party could be assured that the tags are what the monitoring party 
says they are by providing twice the number of tags, half of which could be 
selected at random, disassembled, and returned. It would be impossible to 
verify that there were no secret aspects of the tag (as noted above, some 
subtle secret aspects would be useful to prevent counterfeiting), but it should 
be easy to verify the absence of homing devices, chemical explosives, cam-
eras, or other intrusive devices. 
 In some contexts it may be desirable that tags not uniquely identify 
particular weapons. The monitored party may be concerned, for example, that 
valuable information could be gained if the monitoring nation were able to 
trace the deployment history of individual weapons. Although the easiest way 
to make tags irreproducible is to give each tag a unique serial number, other 
approaches could also to prevent counterfeiting.  
 6. The tagging systems must be extremely reliable and have a very low 
false-alarm rate. False alarms not only undermine the mutual trust of parties 
which a treaty otherwise might engender, but, in sufficient number, they could 
create a background against which cheating would become easier. Designers 
of tagging systems should give some attention to reducing the possibility that 
the monitored party could deliberately act to increase the false alarm rate as a 
prelude to an episode in which illegal weapons would appear in transit or in 
repair and then concealed. 
  7. The physical size and power requirements of the tag should be such 
that the normal functioning of the tagged weapons would not be impaired in 
any way. Once again, the use of open tag technologies combined with the 
random inspection of tags should reassure the monitored party that the tag 
could not somehow harm the weapon. 
 8. The tag must be reliable in the full range of environments that the 
weapon might experience during storage, testing, training, repair, and 
deployment. This may include extremes in temperature, vibration, humidity, 
radiation, etc., and some degree of deliberate abuse or tampering. 
 9. The tagging system must not be excessively costly. An acceptable hard-
ware cost might be as much as a few percent of the cost of the limited weap-
ons, especially if operating costs can be kept relatively low. Because a small 
percentage of the cost of a major weapon system could amount to tens or 
hundreds of millions of dollars, it seems likely that effective systems can be 
designed within this constraint. 
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Verification Systems Using Tags 
 All verification procedures seek to raise the political risk, increase the 
technical difficulty, and elevate the economic cost of cheating. No system can 
eliminate all possibility of cheating, but cheating can at least be made risky, 
difficult, and expensive. For example, tags could not discover hidden stock-
piles of undeclared weapons, but they could make it impossible to mix those 
weapons with weapons being counted against negotiated limits. Depending on 
the facilities that would be open to inspection, this would force the monitored 
party to develop a completely parallel but covert system of production, 
assembly, storage, testing, training, repair, and deployment its secret stock-
pile. Not only would the economic cost of such covert stockpiles be much 
higher than that of allowed weapons, but the risk of being caught—simply by 
an accident that exposed an undeclared weapon to the light of day—could 
well outweigh any military advantage that might otherwise have been gained 
from the undeclared inventory. If, for example, the testing of covertly-
produced missiles could be prevented (such testing is easily monitored by 
NTM), then covert missiles they would become much less valuable to a 
potential cheater. Large clandestine facilities would probably be required to 
maintain, test, and store hidden stocks, since it is generally agreed that the 
size of any undeclared inventory must be a sizable fraction of the allowed 
inventory before it would be significant militarily. 
 The following section examines more closely how tagging systems might 
operate. The discussion is organized according to how the tags would be 
checked: by on-site inspectors, through remote telemetry, or at natural choke 
points or artificial portals in the monitored country. 
 
 Tags as an Aid to On-Site Inspection  
 Perhaps the most straightforward way to use tags would be in conjunction 
with on-site inspection. The use of tags would provide a clear way in which 
information gained at individual on-site inspections could contribute to an 
overall judgment concerning compliance with a treaty. Without tags, on-site 
inspections cannot produce much direct information about the total number of 
weapons deployed unless all sites are inspected simultaneously. Simultaneous 
inspections not only would be extremely intrusive, but,  for many types of 
weapons, simultaneous revelation of the location of all weapons would raise 
the specter of a preemptive strike. In addition, simultaneous inspection would 
require great numbers of inspectors and host-country guides. 
 Under more plausible inspection schemes, but without tagging, one might 
learn that thirty missiles were at site A in January, forty at site B in June, and 
fifty at site C in December. There would be no inherent way to conclude 
whether or not the total number of missiles at all sites at any one time 
exceeded the permissible limit.   A periodically declared roster of how many 
missiles were at each site would reduce this problem, but such  a roster would 
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not give confidence by itself about the completeness of the count at a given 
site. By contrast, if all allowed missiles were tagged, one could tell if every 
missile found at whatever facility was part of the allowed inventory. A single 
missile found anywhere without a valid tag would be prima facie evidence of 
a treaty violation. The first step in instituting a tagging system is to affix tags 
to the controlled weapons. This could be done during an initial round of on-
site inspections, or, if the anti-swapping measures were sufficiently foolproof, 
one could simplify the process greatly by passing out the allowed number of 
tags to the monitored party, whose own personnel would affix them. Ideally, 
tags should be designed so that they could only be affixed within a short time 
after the monitoring period began, or at least so that when inspected they 
would give some evidence of how long they had been attached. There should 
be strong incentives for the monitored party to affix the tags promptly and 
properly to avoid a reservoir of tags that could be affixed to weapons that 
happen to be selected for inspection. In significant degree the necessary 
incentive is inherent in the tagging scheme, because maintaining a reserve of 
tags would increase the number of untagged weapons and thus the chance 
that an untagged weapon would be discovered. Note that tags need not be 
irremovable—they must only indicate in some obvious way that they had been 
removed. 
 Careful thought should be given to the particular component (or compo-
nents) to which the tags would be attached. The component should be an 
essential part of the weapon system, and it should be difficult to swap this 
component between systems on short notice. As noted above, the main turret 
would be a good place to tag a tank, and the  barrel  might serve for a artillery 
piece. Many missiles are normally stored in canisters, and most mobile mis-
siles are launched directly from the canister. Although one would naturally 
prefer to tag the missile itself, this would entail reading the tag through the 
canister or opening the canister for inspection, either of which might present 
difficulties. If the canister were tagged but not sealed, allowed missiles could 
be swapped with undeclared and thus prohibited missiles, thereby providing 
undeclared missiles access to declared facilities. Sealing the canister would 
almost certainly require an on-site human presence, however, and would 
probably complicate missile maintenance. One could develop a fiber-optic 
mesh that would surround a canister, while still allowing access to small mis-
sile components inside for adjustments and repairs, but not allowing separa-
tion of the canister and missile. The mesh would be made of a continuous sin-
gle fiber that could not be cut without interrupting a light beam flowing 
through it, giving a signal that would be recorded by the tag electronics.2 
                                                        
2 The fiber-optic mesh was suggested to the authors by Richard L. Garwin. 
 
 47
 During an on-site inspection, inspectors would locate limited weapons and 
attempt to verify the authenticity of their tags and to verify that the tags had 
never been removed. (If tag reading was difficult, as would be likely for pat-
tern-based tags, a random sample of the tags could be checked.)  Electronic 
tags could be equipped with low-power infrared transponders (much like a 
television's remote control), thereby allowing the tags to be queried from a 
few tens of meters away. Such tags are already in use in commercial assembly 
lines for inventory control. This would reduce the intrusiveness of on-site in-
spections and yet not provide a homing capability that would make the tagged 
weapon vulnerable to attack. An extension of this idea would be to let robots 
inspect the tags, or to fly a pilotless airplane over the site to query tags.  
 Procedures would have to be worked out for the return of a tag when a 
controlled weapon was destroyed or otherwise removed from the inventory. 
To prevent testing of undeclared missiles produced at covert facilities, one 
would need to verify that the missile being tested had been tagged and thus 
had been taken from the allowed stockpile. Tags would alleviate the need for 
detailed monitoring of other methods of destruction.  
 If the verification regime permitted inspections on short-notice at the 
option of the monitoring party, they could be timed to take maximum advan-
tage of national intelligence capabilities. The movement of controlled weap-
ons into or out of the facility to be inspected could be monitored closely by 
NTM or by special cooperative measures just prior to the event. Ideally, the 
facility would be closed or put into a stand-down condition until the comple-
tion of the inspection. If inspections could be conducted on short notice, the 
movement of illegal weapons out of declared facilities might be detected. 
Even if an untagged missile were never actually found during an on-site 
inspection, tagging could force a cheater into more obviously suspicious 
behavior. Moreover, because untagged weapons would have to receive 
special handling at all times, tags might greatly increase the number of people 
who knew of a treaty violation on the part of their country, increasing the 
likelihood that the violation would become widely known. 
 The use of on-site checking of tags in providing evidence of cheating—
indeed, the use of any type of on-site inspection for this purpose—should not 
be oversold, because access to the evidence would always be in the control of 
the monitored party. Although it is true that the detection of a single 
untagged missile would be evidence of a violation, the monitored party would 
be unlikely to allow an on-site inspection when such a possibility existed. It 
would always be advantageous from the cheater's perspective to make up 
excuses for delaying or denying an on-site inspection rather than risk discov-
ery of a "smoking gun."  This may lead to a paradox of sorts, because if a 
tagging system were implemented, the lack of a tag could become, in the eyes 
of the world community, the only acceptable evidence of a violation. 
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 Thus, even though tags could provide unambiguous evidence of a viola-
tion with just a single observation, it is unlikely that this would ever happen 
during an on-site inspection. The monitoring party probably would have to 
act on more ambiguous evidence, such as a refusal or delay of on-site inspec-
tions, surreptitious movement of missiles out of declared facilities, tag tam-
pering, or other suspicious behavior. Tagging would have played a role, how-
ever, in eliciting this suspicious behavior. Moreover, because of tagging's 
relative efficiency in detecting violations, tags should reduce the likelihood 
that a country would decide to cheat in the first place (which is presumably 
the main purpose of verification). 
 Tags read on-site could be an excellent way to help build confidence 
between parties who are in compliance with an agreement. Because tags make 
inspections more effective, they would have the virtue of minimizing the 
number of inspections required for a given level of confidence. Tags also 
could reduce the chance that false claims of treaty violation would be used for 
political reasons. 
Monitoring Tags Remotely   
 In general, verification regimes are likely to be easier to negotiate if 
requirements for on-site inspections, especially those involving trained foreign 
personnel at sensitive military locations, are minimized. If tags could be read 
remotely, routine on-site inspections would not be needed to verify limits on 
even small, concealable weapons. Three basic schemes using remote reading 
come to mind: the tag could transmit a continuous or intermittent signal, the 
tag could be provided with a two-way communication link, or the tag could 
record position information for later interrogation.   
 The most obvious remote sensing method is for every tag to transmit a 
coded set of high-frequency radio pulses. The location of the tag could then 
be determined by satellite receivers using time-of-arrival  measurements. If 
other arrangements are made for tracking tags outside of deployment areas, 
the power requirements for the tag beacons could be kept low by installing a 
set of time-of-arrival receivers and a satellite earth station in each deployment 
area. The obvious drawback of this scheme is that one might be able to home 
on the beacons during an attack. The monitored party might be given the 
ability to switch off the transmitters in time of crisis to ease this problem, but 
this would not eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack. In addition, such a 
system might aggravate a crisis, since switching off the beacons could be 
taken to indicate that the monitored party were preparing for war. Even 
worse, there could be pressures to launch an attack while the beacons were 
still on, or shortly after they were switched off, when the approximate loca-
tion of the tagged weapons would still be known. The very necessity of mak-
ing such decisions would distract leaders from dealing with more substantial 
issues. 
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 A better plan would be to have the beacons emit signals randomly and 
infrequently in time, so one would never know the location of a large fraction 
of the tagged weapons at any one time. An inventory of weapons, for exam-
ple, could be equipped with beacons that emitted a signal once every ten days. 
If the weapons were moved once per day, then the monitoring party would 
only know the location of ten percent of the inventory at any one time.  
 In another remote-monitoring scheme, each tag would contain a receiver 
that recorded position information given by a navigation system. This system 
has the advantage that the quality of the location information could be con-
trolled. If, for example, the resolution of the navigation system is too great,  
then the system's output could be filtered to report only the number of a map 
square in which the tag could be found. After a period of time, the degraded 
information stored in the tags could be transmitted to the monitoring party. 
This transmission could be encrypted and security codes added to ensure the 
authenticity of the data. If the time delay were short (a few days), this idea 
would be similar operationally to the beacon scheme. Alternatively, the tags 
could be collected and sent back to the monitoring party and new tags issued. 
The tags themselves would then constitute a time-lagged data base of the 
position of every allowed missile. Tags of this type could be used to enforce 
regional limitations on weapons, such as the number of tanks near the central 
front in Europe. 
 Of course, neither of these tagging systems could detect undeclared weap-
ons. The presence or absence of undeclared weapons would be verified by 
comparing the location information supplied by the tags to NTM data. For 
example, a satellite photograph that showed a controlled weapon at a location 
that was not recorded by any of the tags at that time would be evidence of a 
treaty violation. The advantage of this method is that it would provide reliable 
data on the variable of interest: the number of allowed weapons. The cost 
would probably be low, and data-handling requirements for this system would 
not excessive. 
 These systems do not resolve all problems, however, and they create 
some of their own. First, they rely on NTM to detect violations. Because a 
cheater would be very careful not to expose undeclared weapons to recon-
naissance satellites, the probability of observing a violation would be small. 
One would probably have to depend on accidents (e.g., the crash of a train 
carrying covert missiles) to expose or deter cheating. Second, the system 
would place high demands on technology. It may not be possible to build the 
type of tag described here—the receiver or beacon may simply be too large or 
require too much power. One may have to develop a new receiver, and per-
haps a new navigation system, which would increase costs greatly. It also may 
not be possible to develop tags that are sufficiently reliable. If a photograph 
shows the location of a controlled missile but the tag records the position 
information inaccurately,  then a false indication of a treaty violation would 
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occur. Error-checking and validation protocols may be able to reduce the 
false-alarm rate to negligible levels, but this would have to be demonstrated. 
Third, the monitored party could not program the movements of tagged 
weapons on fixed schedules because the monitoring party would quickly learn 
these patterns and be able to predict the location of, and therefore target, the 
weapons in the future. This is a minimal concern Prudent planning already 
requires that deployment patterns be random, with or without tags, because 
mobile missiles depend for their survivability on the opponent not being able 
to predict where they will be at any given moment.  
 
Monitoring Tags at Choke Points  
 Tags also could be used effectively at natural or artificial "choke points," 
or places through which all or most of the declared weapons must pass at 
least occasionally. As an example of a natural choke point, consider a limit on 
rail-mobile missiles such as the Soviet SS-24 system. It is likely  that  a  num-
ber  of  missiles would be deployed on the same track, or at least that several 
missiles would have to pass a certain point on the track to exchange positions  
(the position of choke points would depend on the topology of the rail net-
work). If choke points could be identified, tag readers could be installed at 
these points, along with sensors to detect untagged weapons. Imagine, for 
example, that a missile were approaching a choke point equipped with sen-
sors.  If the missile had a valid tag, the sensors could read the tag (perhaps 
using the infrared transponder mentioned earlier). If an undeclared missile 
tried to pass through the choke point, however, other sensors, such as scales 
or x-ray machines, would determine that the object could be a missile. The 
monitored party would then be required under the verification regime to allow 
more intrusive inspection to prove that the object was not a limited weapon 
(e.g., video cameras could be used to look inside the railroad car). A refusal 
to allow such an inspection would cast serious doubt on treaty compliance, 
although it would not constitute direct evidence of a violation. 
 Another example of a natural choke point can be found in the deployment 
of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on submarines.  Because the portals for 
bringing cruise missiles on board submarines are likely to be limited, one 
could deploy sensors that would detect the presence of fissile material at each 
portal. Every time the sensors detected fissile material, they would also expect 
to read a valid tag. This scheme is clearly not foolproof, but it might be better 
than allowing the number of submarine-based cruise missiles to remain unre-
stricted. This scheme is unlikely to work with surface ships, since there are 
too many ways to bring missiles (and heavily shielded warheads) on board. 
(Given the possibility of underway replenishment of submarines, the scheme 
may be unworkable for them as well.) 
 If a natural choke point could not be found, one could be created by sur-
rounding declared facilities with monitored fences that force the movement of 
 51
mobile missiles or critical components through a gate where they could be 
observed and counted. The declared facilities could be any combination of 
production, assembly, storage, testing, training, repair, and deployment areas. 
The fence, or perimeter, would be a two-dimensional barrier around the 
monitored party's facilities that could not be violated without detection. A 
wide variety of fence sensors could be used, including seismic detectors, 
microwave intrusion detectors, acoustic sensors, video and infrared cameras, 
metal detectors, short-range radars, or pressure sensors. Possible monitoring 
devices at the gate, or portal, might be video or infrared cameras, weighing 
scales, x-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, or ultra-sound imaging devices, metal 
detectors, and human inspectors. The perimeter/portal data could be trans-
mitted to the monitoring party in a secure mode or interpreted by human 
inspectors stationed at the site. 
 Consider the case of a perimeter/portal system at an assembly plant. If a 
limited weapon had not yet been produced, this would be the ideal point to 
verify limits on the weapon so long as it could not easily be assembled with-
out detection at other unidentified or undeclared facilities. When a finished 
weapon was ready to leave the assembly plant, the monitored party could 
simply declare the weapon and the count of deployed systems would be 
increased. If the monitored party did not declare the weapon, monitoring 
devices at the portal would determine that the object could be a limited 
weapon. Unless further inspection was permitted to determine that the object 
were not a limited weapon, the monitored party would be in violation of the 
treaty when the weapon left the facility. 
  This system would have the advantage that declared weapons would not 
be inspected by intrusive devices at the portal. But to retain this advantage, 
declared weapons would have to be tagged before leaving the facility so that 
they could be returned for maintenance. Without tags, the monitoring party 
would have to inspect any returned weapons to ensure that the monitored 
party was not returning bogus weapons and replacing them with real weap-
ons. Tags also would prevent covertly-produced weapons from having access 
to declared production and assembly plants. 
 It is much more likely, however, that a substantial number of weapons 
would already have been deployed before limits could be placed upon them, in 
which case a method to establish the initial inventory would be needed. On-
site inspections at declared facilities could help establish the initial inventory, 
or perimeter/portal systems could be constructed at these facilities. In the 
latter case, all existing allowed weapons would be tagged. The tag would be 
queried at the portals of testing, storage, training, repair, or deployment 
facilities, and only weapons with valid tags could enter the facility. As before, 
sensors at the portal would detect any undeclared object that could be a lim-
ited weapon; such objects would be subject to further inspection, or be denied 
passage within the terms of the treaty. If desired, weapons could be moni-
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tored even while in transit between declared facilities by installing tag readers 
along commonly-traveled routes or by attaching a tag containing a navigation 
receiver or inertial-guidance package to the weapon. 
 In the absence of tagging, deployment areas present a serious problem for 
perimeter/portal systems for most weapon systems: the perimeter would have 
to be very large and therefore expensive to instrument. For example, if there 
were ten deployment areas of 100 mobile missiles each, and the missiles and 
launch vehicles were hardened to an over-pressure of five pounds per square 
inch, the total perimeter length would be at least 2,000 kilometers. Instru-
mented fencing may cost a million dollars per kilometer to build and install, 
with the entire perimeter system requiring the expenditure of billions of dol-
lars. In addition, many of the sensors considered for the fence, especially 
seismic detectors, radars, and video and infrared cameras, are unlikely to be 
allowed unless the monitored party could be absolutely sure that the informa-
tion collected could not be used for targeting. In such deployment areas, 
remotely-read tagging systems (or those requiring occasional access by tag-
checkers) could make a huge difference in the cost and reliability of count of 
controlled weapons. 
 There are several disadvantages to perimeter/portal systems, especially 
when they are applied to a wide variety of declared facilities. First, both sides 
may be reluctant to allow the other to construct a perimeter composed of a 
wide variety of sensors around some of their most sensitive military areas and 
allow intrusive inspections of any entering or exiting objects that the moni-
toring party claimed could be a limited weapon. The potential for gathering 
intelligence information that was not required for verification purposes would 
be obvious. Second, the perimeter/portal systems would be expensive—even 
more so if supplemented by a human presence. Third, such a system would 
necessarily be very complex, requiring perhaps hundreds of agreed rules gov-
erning the interpretation of data. Finally, perimeter/portal systems probably 
would disturb the normal functioning of declared facilities. However, tagging 
provides a natural complement to perimeter/portal systems, allowing reduced 
intrusiveness within the controlled facilities.  
Tagging and the Negotiation Process 
 Any tagging system must be carefully designed to fit both the characteris-
tics of the weapons being controlled and the degree to which the parties are 
willing to divulge certain types of information (such as past position informa-
tion). Because some aspects of tagging are likely to be technically complex, 
tagging could introduce a further element of difficulty into arms control 
negotiations. This technique, which is intended to increase confidence in 
treaty compliance, could have the opposite effect if the hardware and proto-
cols were not devised with great care. The very act of introducing the possi-
bility of tagging into a negotiation could delay agreement. Substantial 
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research and development on tagging, together with focused technical discus-
sions among the potential parties to an agreement, may be necessary in 
advance of any attempt to include tagging in the negotiations aimed at a spe-
cific limitation.  
 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has suggested that a special Soviet-
American committee of scientists could put forward their views on verifica-
tion to the leadership of the United States and of the Soviet Union. Although 
setting up such a committee could be an important step, a high degree of 
confidence in a proposed tagging scheme might be attained only if the proto-
type hardware were developed and subjected to severe testing substantially in 
advance of an agreement. Such activities are clearly within the charter of the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Administration. A relatively small 
amount of money, on the order of $10 million, would be required for such a 
technology demonstration program.  
 This paper has focused on tagging systems for bilateral U.S.-USSR or 
NATO-Warsaw Pact agreements, it also would be possible to adapt tagging to 
truly multilateral agreements. While various aspects of the tagging protocol 
and of methods for ensuring noncopying of tags would be more complex, 
preliminary investigation suggests that the difficulties would not be insuper-
able. 
Conclusions 
 If negotiated limits on relatively small, easily-concealed weapons such as 
mobile or cruise missiles are important, the problem of verification will have 
to be solved before agreements can be completed. In general, there are three 
ways to go about this: ban the weapons altogether, accept a lower standard of 
verification than for large, fixed systems, or develop new monitoring tech-
niques to provide adequate verification. 
 The first solution may be unacceptable when the weapons in question are 
considered to make a positive overall contribution to national security and 
international stability, as in the case of mobile missiles, or when dual-capable 
systems are already deployed, as in the case of cruise missiles. The second 
solution is also widely regarded as unacceptable. Many U.S. politicians are 
predisposed to believe that the Soviet Union will cheat on agreements when-
ever possible, and it is unlikely that an important treaty could withstand these 
suspicions unless a convincing case could be made that Soviet compliance 
would be verified and violations detected. 
 Tags could be part of the third solution. Although dozens of ideas for tags 
already exist, it is probably not wise at this point to spend too much time or 
money developing and testing tag hardware. Tags could be designed that 
meet all of the generic requirements outlined above: resistance to counter-
feiting, spoofing, swapping, espionage, homing, etc. Instead, more work is 
needed to explore the feasibility of tagging concepts and to define the overall 
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verification system of which tags could be a part, because the tag technology 
needed will depend much more on the verification regime as a whole than on 
any general requirements that tags must meet. Once a promising verification 
system is defined that requires a certain type of tag, then the development of 
specific tagging hardware could go forward productively. 
 Three generic tagging concepts have been considered in this chapter: tags 
read during normal on-site inspections, tags that give location information 
remotely, and tags read at natural or artificial choke points. Each system 
would require a different type of tag, ranging from microchip tags with infra-
red transponders to navigation receivers and fissile-material detectors. Using 
tags as a supplement to on-site inspection may be the simplest system to 
implement because it places low demands on technology. Tags make on-site 
inspections more efficient and effective, and may also make them more 
acceptable by replacing humans with sensors of limited and known capacities, 
thereby decreasing the potential for espionage. Remote reading of tags further 
decreases the necessity for an on-site human presence, but places higher 
demands on technology and may be less effective because of its reliance on 
NTM to detect undeclared weapons. Using tag readers at choke points is an 
attractive idea, but it is often difficult to find natural choke points and con-
structing artificial choke points could be very intrusive and expensive. The 
power of the tagging concept is such that permanent choke points and 
perimeter/portal systems may be obviated.  
 Tags are a technical fix that will only aid the negotiating process to the 
degree that those technical difficulties with verification that tags could amelio-
rate are delaying the completion of treaties. Even if tags could make numeri-
cal limits on certain weapons easier to verify, there may be other barriers to 
agreement. To the degree that this is the case, instead of being part of the 
solution tags could become part of the problem—a source of endless detailed 
technical discussion that could be used to obfuscate more fundamental differ-
ences. An agreement incorporating tags would undoubtedly be far more 
detailed and more difficult to negotiate than one without tags. Although the 
United States and the Soviet Union have shown an ability to negotiate techni-
cally complex treaties—SALT II, the INF treaty, and the agreement limiting 
peaceful nuclear explosions, for example—such complications should only be 
introduced when an agreement would be impossible without them. 
 In summary, while tags are not a panacea for the problems of monitoring 
numerical limits on concealable weapons, they could have much to offer if 
part of a carefully-designed system. To be truly available for inclusion in a 
future treaty, tagging systems will have to be the subject of detailed previous 
discussion among the parties, including parallel technical research and devel-
opment on both sides. 
